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Abstract
By using data on cross-border acquisitions (CBAs), this paper explores the dis-
tribution of alternative strategies pursued when multinational enterprises integrate a
foreign subsidiary into their organizational structure. Based on a measure of vertical re-
latedness, each of the 165,000 acquisitions in our sample covering 31 source and 58 host
countries can be classified as horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate. Three novel features
of CBAs are highlighted. First, horizontal and vertical CBAs are relatively stable over
time. Second, a considerable part of CBAs are conglomerate acquisitions whereby the
financial sector is an important, though by far not the only, segment involved. Third,
the wave-like growth of CBAs arises primarily from changes in conglomerate activity.
JEL classification: F15, F21, F23, F33
Keywords: Cross-Border Acquisitions; Multinational Firm; Horizontal Acquisitions;
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1 Introduction
Economists have long been concerned with the potential benefits and costs of international
financial integration. In this context, foreign direct investment (FDI) is often seen as more
beneficial to other forms of international capital flows as it tends more stable and less
linked to short-term fluctuations on financial markets. More specifically, trade economists
often distinguish between horizontal and vertical FDI that identify different benefits of
multinational enterprises (MNEs) with plants in several countries. Specifically, horizontal
FDI rests on a firms’ desire to access a foreign market by replicating production abroad.
Vertical FDI relates to endowment seeking motives with firms breaking up the supply chain
to take advantage of lower factor costs abroad. These different strategies are also thought
to reflect the purported distribution of FDI between developed and developing countries.
Yet, while the distinction between different strategies pursued by MNEs is well-grounded
in trade theory, there have been few attempts to directly observe the relative importance
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of horizontal and vertical FDI in the global economy. The main exception to this is Alfaro
and Charlton (2009). Using firm level data from established affiliates for the year 2005,
their paper is important in that it (a) developed a methodology to directly distinguish
between alternative modes of FDI and (b) highlighted that, particularly between developed
countries, vertical FDI is far more common than has long been thought. However, Alfaro
and Charlton (2009) restrict the classification to horizontal and vertical integration in the
manufacturing sector and do not explicitly highlight the changes in the composition of these
strategies across time. Earlier studies relying on foreign affiliates’ data of US manufacturers
to analyze the role of different strategies of multinational integration are Brainard (1997)
and Carr et al. (2002). A more recent example following this approach is Ramondo et al.
(2014).
This paper follows a different strand of the literature that analyzes FDI through the lens of
cross-border acquisitions (CBAs). Together with greenfield investment, CBAs constitute the
main form of FDI and are a particularly important mode of entry into developed countries
(Antra`s and Yeaple, 2014, p.66). However, acquisitions abroad tend to be more volatile and
can, in some years, be more or less equal to the importance of greenfield investment and
during some periods (e.g. around 2007) exceed it. As with greenfield investment, CBAs
involve all sectors and—reflecting the distribution of FDI in general—occur predominantly
between developed countries. Yet, the share of developing countries hosting foreign acqui-
sitions (mainly from developed countries) has recently increased markedly from around 10
per cent of total activity in 1990 to around 40 per cent in 2011.1 The key role of CBAs has
been recognized in the recent FDI-literature (both theoretical and empirical) including Di
Giovanni (2005), Neary (2007), Nocke and Yeaple (2007), Head and Ries (2008), Hijzen et
al. (2008), Coerdacier et al. (2009), and Erel et al. (2012). We contribute to this literature
by uncovering the empirical importance of horizontal and vertical FDI from CBAs across 31
source and 58 host countries, but also across time with the data covering the 1990 to 2011
period. This therefore adds an important dimension to papers such as Alfaro and Charl-
ton (2009) and Ramondo et al. (2014), which have analyzed horizontal and vertical FDI
strategies with data confined to a cross-section, the manufacturing sector, and sometimes a
single source country (typically the US). As such, our more comprehensive sample provides
insights into how the different strategies that MNEs can pursue when acquiring established
firms abroad vary across countries and time and what factors drive these differences.
The resulting distribution confirms some of the predictions of standard FDI theory. In
particular, as expected from the discussion above, market size, but not wage (e.g. factor
cost) differences matter for horizontal CBAs and vice versa for vertical CBAs. However,
we also find that large parts of CBA activity do not fit into the conventional theories of
multinational integration. In particular, even with a generous parametrization to determine
vertical relatedness, more than 20 per cent of all deals are conglomerate, that is the ac-
quiring and target firms neither share the same (horizontal) industry nor are they vertically
1Data on the composition of FDI can be found in the UN World Investment Report 2015. These data show
that with greenfield investment, the sectoral split (by value and for 2014) between services and manufacturing
is more or less equal. For CBAs, the UN data shows a slight dominance of services (around 53 per cent of
the total by value for 2014).
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linked through the supply chain (with a stricter benchmark, up to 40 per cent of CBAs are
categorized as conglomerate). Since our CBA data come in form of a panel, they permit us
to look at the development of the different FDI strategies across time, which gives rise to
several observations that have, to our knowledge, not yet been made. Specifically, despite
the pronounced wave-like fluctuations in overall FDI (and CBAs), the part attributable to
horizontal and vertical strategies is less volatile than conglomerate CBAs, which seem to be
driven by financial factors and react strongly to international valuation effects. Conversely,
neither horizontal nor vertical CBAs appear to be significantly driven by valuation effects.
A number of new insights arise from these results. Most notably, while one of the ’attrac-
tive’ features of FDI over other forms of capital flows is reportedly its lower volatility, this
may be true for those parts that are associated with horizontal and vertical strategies, but
less for conglomerate FDI. Furthermore, while economists have spent considerable effort
in detailing the drivers (both theoretically and empirically) of horizontal and vertical FDI,
more attention has to be directed at conglomerate strategies, which seem to account for a
non-negligible part of global activity. The overall headline is that while it is important to
understand the composition of international capital flows in gauging the effects of financial
integration, it is equally important to account for the composition of different modes of FDI.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews briefly the related literature. The
method to distinguish horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate strategies from CBA data is
outlined in Section 3 while Section 4 provides a descriptive overview of the resulting pattern
of acquisition strategies. Section 5 outlines the empirical strategy allowing to connect the
different forms of CBAs with established explanatory variables. Section 6 presents the
results and explores the role of valuation effects upon conglomerate and other forms of
CBAs. Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
2 CBAs as FDI: Related Literature
The literature on FDI is extensive with considerable emphasis on the distinction between
horizontal and vertical strategies which relates to the potential drivers and effects of these
two alternative forms of FDI. One stream of recent research has focused on CBAs as the
mechanism via which firms establish control of affiliates in different locations and which
is consistent with the observation that, in particular between developed countries, CBAs
can account for a substantial proportion of FDI in any one year. Various theoretical and
empirical contributions reflect the role of CBAs: Head and Ries (2009), Neary (2007), and
Nocke and Yeaple (2007) represent theoretical contributions while empirical work includes
contributions by Di Giovanni (2005), Courdacier et al. (2010), Hijzen et al. (2008), and
Erel et al. (2012).
Reflecting the overall concern about FDI strategies, the empirical literature that employs
CBA data has recognized the relevance of distinguishing between alternative forms of FDI,
but the attempts to address it to date have been inadequate. In particular, studies have
neither made an attempt to take directly into account the nature of vertical linkages between
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acquiring and target firms nor account for the potential significance of CBAs involving
conglomerate deals. Hijzen et al. (2008, p.851) and Courdacier et al. (2009, p.69) have
only considered the distinction between horizontal (defined as the ’same’ industry) and
’non-horizontal’ CBAs; they also ignore the fact that MNEs are often highly diversified
companies in the sense of operating in more than one industry. Breinlich (2008) separates
horizontal CBAs (also defined as the ’same’ industry) with the remainder as ’conglomerate’
that goes beyond industry boundaries but makes no reference to the vertical relatedness that
characterizes links between or, at a broad industry aggregate, possibly also within industries.
Research in financial economics has also been guilty of this approach with diversifying CBAs
accounted for by a dummy variable when involving acquisitions not in the same industry
(see Erel et al., 2012). We address the identification strategy below which—using near
universal coverage of CBAs between 1990 and 2011—forms the basis for an assessment of
the distribution of CBAs/FDI in the world economy and over time including the merger-
waves that have characterized this time period.
3 Distinguishing Horizontal, Vertical, and Conglomer-
ate CBAs
Key to uncovering the distribution of the different strategies pursued by MNEs is to develop a
methodology identifying the relationship between the parent firm and the foreign subsidiary
where an investment takes place. To obtain an overview of the different strategies, we
have extracted all cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) from Thomson Reuter’s SDC Platinum
Database, which claims to have recorded virtually all mergers and acquisition deals between
companies around the world since 1990.2 SDC Platinum reports the standard industry
classification (SIC) codes of the acquiring and target, denoted here by, respectively, SICα
and SICτ , which provides the basis to identify the horizontal and vertical linkages between
the merging firms.3 In particular, in case SICα = SICτ , a deal occurs between firms
sharing the same industry—a characteristic feature of a horizontal strategy were MNEs
replicate production stages in several countries.
However, even a detailed industry classification remains uninformative about the extent of
vertical integration. To see why, note that a scenario where an acquisition occurs across
industries, that is SICα 6= SICτ , does not automatically imply that firms are connected
through the supply chain, since such a deal could also involve an acquirer and target that
have, with respect to the industries in which they operate, nothing in common. To establish
whether merging firms are vertically integrated necessitates additional information on the
upstream and downstream linkages across industries. For this, we draw on the results
of Fan and Lang (2000) as well as Fan and Goyal (2006) who—following earlier work of
2SDC Platinum data has been used elsewhere in Rossi and Volpin (2004), Di Giovanni (2005), Kessing
et al. (2007), Herger et al. (2008), Hijzen et al. (2008), Coerdacier et al. (2009), Erel et al. (2012), and
Garfinkel and Hankins (2011) to study various aspects of CBAs.
3As with any classification system, SIC codes offer more or less aggregate levels to delimit industries
ranging from a crude definition involving broad groups such as mining, manufacturing, or services at the
one-digit level to a much more detailed classification encompassing around 1,500 primary economic activities
at the four-digit level. To accurately identify investment strategies pursued by MNEs, we follow Alfaro and
Charlton (2009) who advocate the use of a fairly disaggregated classification at the four-digit level.
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McGuckin (1991) and Matsusaka (1996)—have established the vertical relatedness for a
matrix containing around 500 industries based on the upstream and downstream value flows
between them. In particular, from US input-output tables, they have calculated a so-called
coefficient of vertical relatedness, denoted here by Vατ , in terms of the fraction the input
industry α contributes in added-value to the output of industry τ .4 We match this coefficient
of vertical relatedness with the four-digit SIC codes of the acquiring and target firm for each
deal we extract from SDC Platinum. This methodology is similar to the one used in Alfaro
and Charlton (2009) to classify the vertical relationship between plant level observations
recorded in the WorldBase database as well as by Acemoglu et al. (2009) and Garfinkel and
Hankins (2011) in addressing the factors that determine vertical integration. A classification
of our CBA deals necessitates the specification of a cut-off value, denoted by V , above which
industries would be deemed vertically related. Fan and Goyal (2006, pp.882-883) consider
a cut-off of 1% as well as a stricter value of 5% whilst Alfaro and Charleton (2009) and
Acemoglu et al. (2009) use 5% and 10% to define vertical relatedness. Garfinkel and
Hankins (2011) consider only the relatively low 1% cut-off level. Our baseline results will
draw on the intermediate value of 5%. However, to trace out the effect on the distribution
of different FDI strategies, as robustness checks, the results will be replicated with the
alternative cut-off values.5
Another challenge in determining horizontal and vertical strategies is that firms in general,
and MNEs in particular, often operate in several industries. In our sample, the acquiring
firms are more diversified than the target firms in terms of reporting, on average, activity in
around three and around two industries, respectively. Therefore, although the SDC database
reports a primary SIC, we cannot be sure that, say, the absence of an overlap between these
(primary) codes rules out a horizontal relationship, since a replication of production activities
could also occur with some other industry segment of a diversified firm. To account for this,
we have searched for horizontal and vertical connections between all permutations of the
up to 6 different SIC codes reported for each deal by SDC Platinum.6 Taken together,
as with Alfaro and Charlton (2009), comparing the industries as well as drawing on the
vertical relatedness between the acquiring and target firm provides a direct way to identify
the importance of alternative strategies of multinational integration. Specifically, denoting
the up to 6 industries of the acquiring firm with ρ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and the industries of the
target firm with σ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, gives rise to up to 36 pairs to establish a horizontal,
that is SICρα = SIC
σ
τ or vertical relationship, that is V
ρσ
ατ > V . These pairs define the
4The US input-output tables are updated every 5 years to account for industrial and technological changes.
However, Fan and Goyal (2006, p.882) find that the usage of input-output tables of different years has only
a modest impact upon their results. Hence, we assume that these vertical relatedness coefficients hold over
time which is consistent with the recent work of Alfaro and Chen (2012). Furthermore, using US input-
output tables to define the vertical relatedness for a worldwide sample of MNEs, as is also done in Acemoglu
et al. (2009), raises another issue whether this accurately reflects the technological conditions around the
globe. To account for this, the sensitivity analysis of the results of Section 6 contains a robustness check
with a sub-sample involving only US MNEs.
5Within a given supply chain, vertical relatedness can arise due to commodity flows with upstream vuατ
and/or downstream vdατ activities. Following Fan and Goyal (2006, p.881), in our baseline scenario, no
distinction will be made between these cases in the sense that the maximum value determines the coefficient
of vertical relatedness, that is Vατ = max(vuατ , v
d
ατ )
6Another possibility to avoid the pitfalls when MNEs operate in several industries is to focus on CBA
deals where both the acquirer and target firm report only one SIC code. However, this sub-sample includes
less than 20 per cent of all deals and will, hence, only be considered for our sensitivity analysis in Section 6.
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following strategies:
• Pure Horizontal, that is deals where the firms share at least one pair of the same
four-digit SIC code, but are never vertically related;
• Pure Vertical, that is deals where the acquirer and target operate in different indus-
tries, but share at least one pair of SIC codes exceeding the threshold value defining
vertical relatedness;
• Pure Conglomerate, where, across all the 36 possible combinations of SIC codes,
a deal involves firms that neither share the same industries nor are vertically-related;
and a
• Residual (Complex), where it is not clear whether a deal is driven by a horizontal
or vertical motive (or both).
Table 1 summarizes the definition of the various FDI strategies that can be identified by
means of our CBA data.
Table 1: Strategies of Cross-Border Acquisition
Strategy Horizontal
Relatedness
Vertical
Relatedness
Description
Pure
Horizontal
∃ρ, σ|SICρα = SICστ V ρσατ < V ∀ ρ, σ
Replication of production by acquiring
a foreign facility in the same industry
and on the same stage of the supply-
chain.
Pure
Vertical
SICρα 6= SICστ ∀ ρ, σ ∃ρ, σ|V ρσατ > V
Fragmentation of production by ac-
quiring a foreign facility in a different
industry and production stage but lo-
cated within the same value-chain.
Pure Con-
glomerate
SICρα 6= SICστ ∀ ρ, σ V ρσατ < V ∀ ρ, σ
The merging firms are neither horizon-
tally related through sharing the same
industry nor are they vertically con-
nected through the supply-chain.
Residual
(Complex)
∃ρ, σ|SICρα = SICστ ∃ρ, σ|V ρσατ > V
Cases where either the classification is
unclear (or the MNE pursues a com-
plex strategy).
Inevitably, the definition of horizontal and vertical strategies is not always unambiguous as
the classification depends on the cut-off value of vertical relatedness or the level of detail of
the SIC codes as discussed above. Furthermore, aside from the established pure horizontal
and vertical group, two additional cases arise. The first is pure conglomerate acquisitions
in which, across the potential 36 combinations of four-digit SICs, no horizontal or vertical
relationship is found. While this strategy has been noticed in the finance literature, it
has by and large been ignored in the economic analysis of FDI and, as mentioned above,
never been characterized beyond the crude criterion of firms operating outside the same
industry. Secondly, since our classification method looks for industrial connections across
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multiple combinations of SIC codes reported by the acquiring and target firm, deals can also
exhibit both, a horizontal and a vertical relationship. This ’non-pure’ case does not lend
itself to a straightforward interpretation. In particular, though Yeaple (2003) has developed
a theory of so-called ’complex FDI’, where MNEs are thought to pursue a combination
of horizontal and vertical strategies, other interpretations where overlaps reflect e.g. a
classification issue are also conceivable. To indicate that we remain agnostic about the
exact interpretation of ’non-pure’ CBAs, we prefer to refer to this group as a ’residual’. In
any case, our residual (complex) group is less of a concern since the results below focus
on the ’pure’ horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate strategies that lend themselves to a
relatively clear interpretation.7
4 An Overview of CBAs between 1990 and 2011
For the 1990 to 2011 period, this section provides a descriptive overview of our sample with
165,106 CBAs reported by SDC Platinum during that period. The descriptive overview, as
well as the econometric analysis of Sections 5 and 6, focus on the number of observed deals
rather than their value. This is because in more than half of the cases, the deal value has not
been disclosed by the merging companies8, so the coverage of the number of observed deals
is much more complete. However, the number of deals follows by and large the observed
pattern of the value data (Hijzen et al., 2008, pp.852ff; Erel et al., 2012, pp.1053ff.).
Our sample includes all deals by MNEs headquartered in one of the 31 source countries9 listed
in the data appendix. These source countries account for more than 95 per cent of all deals
reported in SDC during the period under consideration. The left column of the top panel
of Table 2 reports the top-ten source countries for CBAs. A handful of large and developed
source countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and
France account already for more than 50 per cent of all deals. Furthermore, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and Switzerland, which belong to the economically and financially most developed
countries, are also important sources of international merger activity. Comparing the top-
ten source with the largest host countries at the bottom left of Table 2 reveals a similar
degree of concentration and a noteworthy overlap that has also been documented with other
FDI data (see e.g. Brainard, 1997, pp.525-526). The main difference between the most
important source and host countries is that emerging markets such as China and some large
southern European countries such as Spain and Italy replace the above mentioned small
developed countries when reporting the main recipients of CBAs.
The bottom panel of Table 2 provides a breakdown of the CBA deals between high income
(or developed) countries as defined by the World Bank and middle as well as low income (or
developing) countries. In line with the distribution of FDI in general, deals between devel-
oped countries dominate by accounting for almost 75 per cent of all CBAs. Acquisitions by
7Considering deals between single business firms discussed in footnote 6 eliminates again the contingency
of finding acquisitions meeting both criteria defining horizontal and vertical integration.
8See also Di Giovanni (2005, p.134).
9The country where a MNE is headquartered is here considered to be the ultimate source country reported
in SDC. This might matter when acquisitions occur through complex ownership chains. However, in around
80 per cent of the deals in our sample, the immediate and ultimate source country are identical.
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Table 3: Proportion of CBA Strategies across different Values of V
Cut-off (V ) Pure Horizontal Pure Vertical Conglomerate Residual (Com-
plex)
1% 8% 55% 20% 17%
5% 19% 28% 36% 17%
10% 35% 11% 44% 10%
developed countries in the developing world make up another 20 per cent or so. Acquisitions
by developing countries are only a small fraction of the entire sample.
Following the classification procedure outlined in Section 3, Table 3 shows the distribution
of CBA deals in our sample across the different FDI strategies. Our sample suggests that the
proportion of horizontal and vertical motives when MNEs integrate foreign affiliates depends
crucially on the cut-off value V defining vertical relatedness. In particular, with a relatively
strict value of 10%, horizontal deals dominate. The opposite result arises when considering
a cut-off of 1%, where 55 per cent of all deals are considered to be vertical, which coincides
with the proportion reported by Garfinkel and Hankins (2011, p.520) for a sample with US
multinationals. The shifts in the empirical importance of strategies across different values
of V underscores the need to consider, as a sensitivity check, alternatives to the 5% cut-off
value.
Regardless of the criterion to define vertical relatedness, Table 3 shows that horizontal and
vertical strategies account only for roughly one half of the deals in our sample of CBAs. In
particular, even when using a lenient 1% cut-off for V , about one fifth of the deals are still
considered to be conglomerate with much higher proportions arising with stricter values:
with the 10% cut-off, the proportion of vertical deals falls while conglomerate deals account
for over 40 per cent of the total sample of CBAs. To our knowledge, the FDI literature has
by and large ignored the possibility that a considerable proportion of MNEs could pursue
conglomerate strategies when investing abroad.
Figure 1 summarizes the distribution of CBAs across industries. In particular, the y-axis
relates to the two-digit primary SIC code of the acquiring firm plotted against the two-digit
primary SIC code for the target firm on the x-axis. The surface of the marker represents
the proportional weight of the number of CBAs in a given combination of industries relative
to the total number of CBAs. Intra-industry deals, defined as those that do not cross the
two-digit SIC code between acquiring and target firm, are located on the main diagonal
and are marked with boldface circles. Off-diagonal markers, with normal circles, indicate
the importance of inter-industry deals occurring between broadly defined activities or even
across sectors. The industries are arranged according to their SIC code meaning that the
primary sector—that is agriculture, mining, and construction—appears on the bottom left
followed by the manufacturing sector, transportation, wholesaling and retailing (distribu-
tion), financial services, and other services at the top right. Note that with the exception of
financial firms and parts of the wholesaling and retailing sector, most of these acquisitions
are intra-industry in nature.
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Figure 1: Industrial Composition of CBAs, All Deals (165,106 Deals)
ManufacturingPrimary Sector Transport Distribution Finance Services
Primary 
Sector
Manu-
facturing
Trans-
port
Distri-
bution
Finance
Services
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Table 4: CBA deals within the Manufacturing Sector (SIC 2000-3999)
#All
CBAs
#Horizon-
tal CBAs
#Vertical
CBAs
#Conglome-
rate CBA
#Residual
CBAs
CBAs within manufacturing 42,030 8,219 12,679 7,689 13,443
Other CBAs 123,076 23,553 33,985 51,1127 10,982
Total 165,106 31,772 46,664 58,816 34,425
As shown in Figure 1, our sample covers all sectors. However, since important parts of
the literature on FDI have only looked at manufacturing, it is worthwhile to report how
our CBAs, and the resulting characterization of alternative strategies (defined here with
V = 5%), are distributed within this specific sector. In particular, for the 1990 to 2011
period, Table 4 separates out CBAs within the manufacturing sector, defined as deals where
the acquiring and target firms’ primary SIC code are between 2000 and 3999. Of note,
though manufacturing has been the focus of some empirical studies into FDI strategies (e.g.
Carr et al., 2001; Alfaro and Charlton, 2009), it accounts only for around one fourth of all
CBA deals. Based on the definitions of Section 3, the following discussion compares the
geographica and sectoral distribution of the pure strategies encapsulated in the full sample
of CBAs.
As regards the group of pure horizontal deals, Table 2 reports the corresponding top-ten
source and host countries. Compared with the full sample, the ranking changes barely with
pure horizontal CBAs involving again mainly large developed countries. The main exceptions
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are that Japan is replaced by Italy and China by Sweden in the list of, respectively, the 10
most important source and host countries. Within the context of the theoretical literature
on the MNE, this dominance of large and developed countries is perhaps not surprising
since horizontal strategies are primarily thought to be market-access seeking meaning that
countries with similar factor endowments and large domestic markets ought to be the main
target for multinational integration.
With the surface of the markers representing again the weight relative to the total number
of deals, Figure 2 displays the industrial composition of CBAs classified according to the
method of Section 3 as ’pure horizontal’. Intuitively, almost all of these deals lie on the di-
agonal; that is they are intra-industry in terms of occurring between firms sharing the same
two-digit primary SIC code. Though horizontal deals off the main diagonal can arise since
the overlapping industries could also involve business segments that are not the primary
activity of an acquiring or target firm, within the current sample, this scenario is empir-
ically unimportant. In manufacturing, horizontal deals within food production (SIC 20),
chemical products (SIC 28), measurement and precision instruments (SIC 38), commercial
machinery (SIC 35), and electrical equipment (SIC 36) are the most important. Though the
manufacturing sector accounts for around 25 per cent of horizontal CBAs (see Table 4), this
strategy is also pursued elsewhere. In particular, a substantial amount of acquisitions, where
firms replicate activities abroad, arises also with business services (SIC 73), engineering and
accounting firms (SIC 87), and hotels (SIC 70) in the services sector, depository banks (SIC
60) and insurance carriers (SIC 63) in finance, wholesaling (SIC 50, 51) in the distribution
sector, electric, gas and sanitary services (SIC 49) in the transportation and public utilities
sector, or oil and gas extraction (SIC 13) in the primary sector.
Less consistent with conventional theories of the MNE is that, as shown in Table 2, eco-
nomically developed source and host countries dominate in CBAs involving acquiring and
target firms that operate on different stages of the same supply chain. In contrast to this,
theories about vertical integration such as that of Helpman (1984) suggest such CBAs to
be driven by the desire to exploit relative endowment differences and, hence, should mainly
involve host countries with different factor endowments and lower wage cost. By and large,
the top-ten hosts for vertical deals reported in Table 2 do not fall into the group of low-wage
countries. The only exception is China that might attract deals motivated by the desire to
outsource labor intensive production stages. Furthermore, similar to the overall sample, the
breakdown in the bottom panel of Table 2 reveals that regardless the development stage of
the involved countries, around one fourth of all deals are classified as vertical (defined with
V = 5%). This confirms the observation of Alfaro and Charlton (2009) that substantial
parts of FDI between developed countries are driven by a vertical strategy. Finally, Table
4 shows that, similar to the overall sample, around one fourth of vertical CBAs occurred in
the manufacturing sector.
Figure 3 depicts the industrial composition of the deals classified as pure vertical using again
the 5% cut-off level. Though, compared with horizontal CBAs, the markers are slightly
more dispersed, the bulk of deals involving firms that operate on different stages of the
same supply chain still lies on the main diagonal marked by the bold circles representing
11
Figure 2: Industrial Composition of Horizontal CBAs (31,771 Deals)
intra-industry activity. For the case of vertical acquisitions, these are firms that operate
on slightly different production stages within the same two-digit SIC code. The empirical
dominance of ”intra-industry” vertical integration was first observed by Alfaro and Charlton
(2009) by looking at the manufacturing sector. However, in our more comprehensive sample,
intra-industry CBAs do not only arise in large numbers in the manufacturing sector—mainly
within chemical products (SIC 28), electrical equipment (SIC 36), printing and publishing
(SIC 27), or food production (SIC 20)—but also elsewhere, including in business services
(SIC 73), communications (SIC 49), metal mining (SIC 10), or financial brokers (SIC 62)
and holding companies (SIC 67) in the finance industry.10
As noted above, most of the FDI literature has focused on the distinction between horizontal
and vertical FDI whereas conglomerate strategies rarely draw attention. In contrast, against
the background of an alleged conglomerate domestic merger wave in the US during the 1960s
and 1970s (see e.g. Matsusaka, 1996), the possibility of diversifying mergers and acquisitions
10CBAs involving the distribution and retailing sector are relatively rare, which manifests itself in a gap
in the markers along the diagonal of Figure 3. Referring back to the observation of footnote 6 that a vertical
relationship can arise with the upstream and the downstream activities, this may matter: Conventional
theories of the MNE connect the motives for vertical integration with endowment-seeking. However, the
(forward) integration of a distribution network might be driven by market access considerations that have
more in common with motives that are usually attributed to horizontal strategies. Though such cases are
empirically unimportant, a robustness check will be carried out in Section 6 distinguishing between cases
where the vertical relationship arises only with, respectively, the upstream and downstream stages of the
supply chain.
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Figure 3: Industrial Composition of Vertical CBAs (46,664 Deals)
has received more attention in the finance and industrial organization literature. Instead
of exploiting synergies between industries when replicating production processes in several
locations or outsourcing production stages to low wage countries, financial frictions (e.g.
Williamson, 1970) or corporate governance problems manifesting themselves in principal-
agent issues between shareholders and management (e.g. Amihud and Lev, 1981; Williamson
1981, pp.1557ff.; Mueller, 1969) provide, arguably, motives for conglomerate mergers and
acquisitions. When analyzing the empirical distribution of CBAs, as far as we are aware,
financial and corporate governance motives have by and large been neglected. Exceptions
to this include Rossi and Volpin (2004), who suggest that acquisitions involve often host
countries with poorer shareholder protection than the source country and, hence provide
a vehicle to export high corporate governance standards. Furthermore, Erel et al. (2012)
suggest that CBAs can be a reflection of financial arbitrage arising in incompletely integrated
capital markets (see also Baker et al., 2008). However, neither of these papers suggest
that corporate governance or valuation effects could be particularly relevant to explain
conglomerate CBAs.
Recall from Table 3 that a substantial number of our CBA deals appear to be conglomerate
in nature. Furthermore, the breakdown in Table 2 suggests that acquiring and target firms in
developed countries account again for around 75 per cent of all conglomerate deals. Using the
method of Section 3 with the 5 % value for V , Figure 4 displays the industrial composition
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of the more than 58,000 deals classified as pure conglomerate. In general, compared with
horizontal and vertical CBAs, the resulting pattern exhibits more dispersion across different
sectors and industries and involves substantial inter-industry activity. This is perhaps not
surprising since the distinctive feature of conglomerate strategies is diversification in terms
of combining firms that operate in entirely different industries. Compared with the previous
figures, another obvious difference is that many conglomerate deals involve the finance sector.
Specifically, more than 40 per cent of the firms making a conglomerate acquisition affiliated
themselves primarily to this sector. With a corresponding fraction of 20 per cent, particularly
dominant are holdings and investment offices (SIC 67) as an acquirer with targets located
across all sectors. These deals are undertaken by private equity firms, investor groups, asset
management firms, etc. Berkshire Hathaway would be a well-known example for this case
with ownership (or part ownership) in a broad range of activities including confectionary,
clothing, transport, retail, the food industry, gas and electrical utilities among many others.
With a fraction of slightly more than 10 per cent, conglomerate deals occur less commonly
within manufacturing (see Table 4). However, conglomerate deals with an acquiring firm that
is primarily affiliated to the manufacturing sector can, for example, be found in substantial
numbers with highly diversified industrial conglomerates such as Siemens, Mitsubishi, or
General Electric (GE). The latter operates e.g. across activities as diverse as aircraft, oil
and gas, household appliances, and healthcare.
Figure 4: Industrial Composition of Conglomerate CBAs (58,816 Deals)
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One advantage of our panel data on CBAs is that, in contrast to the cross section employed
by Alfaro and Charlton (2009), the evolution of the different strategies pursued by MNEs
can be traced over time. Figure 5 depicts this development for the 1990-2011 period. One of
the features of globalization in recent decades has been the wave-like growth of international
mergers and acquisitions. Note that the merger-waves peaked in the year 2000 around the
bursting of the Dotcom bubble and again in 2007 with the beginning of the global financial
crisis. Within the present context, it is perhaps worth noting that the observed international
merger waves are unlikely to be driven by the determinants commonly associated with hor-
izontal or vertical strategies. The reason is that variables such as market size or differences
in factor cost change gradually rather than exhibiting dramatic upsurges that come to an
abrupt end.
Figure 5: CBAs Over Time and Their Composition: 1990-2011
Figure 5 shows that horizontal and vertical FDI have been relatively constant over the
whole period. There were less than 1000 horizontal deals per year at the beginning of the
1990s and the corresponding number stood at around 1500 deals at the end of the sample
period. Vertical deals grew from around 1000 per year to around 2500 during the period
under consideration. Conversely, conglomerate acquisitions tripled from around 1000 deals
to around 3000 deals. Also, conglomerate CBAs contributed more to each merger wave.
In particular, at the end of the 1990s, they increased to more than 4000 deals per year
and reached an even higher peak in 2007 with almost 4500 deals. An equivalent growth
and subsequent collapse did not arise with horizontal and vertical acquisitions. Finally,
during the period under consideration, the importance of the developing world within the
international market for corporate control has increased noticeably. In particular, Figure
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5 shows a clear upward trend in the percentage of CBAs where the host was a developing
country.
5 Econometric Strategy: Location Choice and the In-
ternational Market for Corporate Control
5.1 Background
As discussed above, in particular between developed countries, CBAs are by far the most
common form of FDI and the data on the corresponding deals—that are henceforth indexed
with i = 1, . . . , N—are available on an almost universal basis. Also, the acquisition of a
foreign firm can be seen as an event uncovering a location choice. To formalize such choices,
Head and Ries (2008) model FDI as an outcome of the (international) market for corporate
control. Specifically, to be able to outpay potential rivals during a bidding contest in year t,
an acquiring MNE headquartered in source country s should derive the highest value νish,t
from taking over a target firm in host country h. This implies that the probability of a CBA
deal between a given source and host country follows an extreme value distribution, such
as the multinomial logit distribution used in Head and Ries (2008), to identify the MNE
with the highest ability to pay (see also Hijzen et al., 2008, p.857). Hence, as shown in this
section, modelling FDI as an outcome of the market for corporate control connects naturally
with the conditional logit framework that is commonly used to empirically study the firms’
location choice problem (see e.g. Guimara˜es et al., 2003).
Assume that the value vish,t that an MNE headquartered in source country s can obtain
from a CBA deal i in year t with a target firm located in host country h depends, among
other things, on a set of variables xsh,t according to the equation
νish,t = x
′
sh,tβ + δs + δh + δt + δi + 
i
sh,t with i = 1, . . . , N ;
s = 1, . . . , S;
h = 1, . . . ,H; (1)
t = 1, . . . , T
where β are coefficients measuring the direction and magnitude of the impact. Here, ish,t is
a deal specific error term, to be specified below, that accounts for the stochastic uncertainty
when an MNE gauges the future value of acquiring a foreign firm. To accommodate for
panel data, (1) includes a full set of constants pertaining to the firms involved in a given
deal δi, source country δs, host country δh, and year δt.
To reflect the differences between investment strategies, xsh,t includes variables associated
with the motives for horizontal and vertical integration. Here, the real GDP of the host
country is used to capture the market access motive. For CBAs driven by a horizontal
strategy, GDP is expected to produce a positive sign.11 Conversely, differences in the cost
11Carr et al. (2001) use the sum of the GDP between of the source and host country to capture the joint
16
and endowment of production factors such as labor provide the determinant associated with
vertical strategies. To capture this, Carr et al. (2001) employ international skill differences
measured by an index of occupational categories. Arguably, this approach suffers from sev-
eral caveats. Firstly, the sign reversals between cases where the source or host country is
skill abundant make it difficult to interpret the coefficient of international skill differences
(Blonigen et al., 2003). Secondly, national idiosyncrasies in labor market regulations, tax-
ation, or social security contributions could drive a wedge between factor endowments and
the factor costs that, ultimately, affect an MNEs decision to relocate a production stage.
Based on this observation, Braconier et al. (2005, pp.451ff.) connect vertical FDI directly
with international wage differences between skilled and unskilled labor. Thereto, they draw
on the Prices and Earnings data of UBS (various years) which provides a unique survey of
the salaries of various professions in the capital city or the financial center of a large number
of countries. Following Braconier et al. (2005, pp.451ff.), for each host country, we have
calculated the skilled wage premium SWP by taking the ratio between the wage of a skilled
profession—taken to be engineers—and an unskilled profession—taken to be a toolmaker in
the metal industry. A high value of SWP indicates that skilled labor is relatively scarce
and, in turn, expensive compared with unskilled labor. For vertical deals, SWP is expected
to have a positive effect indicating that countries with relatively cheap unskilled labor lend
themselves to hosting labor intensive stages of the supply chain.12
The following variables are conventionally used to control for other determinants affecting
a MNEs’ desire to acquire a foreign subsidiary. Since it is arguably less costly to mon-
itor affiliates in nearby countries (Head and Ries, 2008), geographic proximity, measured
by the DISTANCE between capital cities, and cultural proximity, measured by common
LANGUAGE dummy variable, are thought to foster CBAs. Furthermore, trade cost and
regional economic integration also matter though the corresponding effect is ambiguous. In
particular, a reduction in trade barriers increases the scope to serve a market by exports
instead of local production, and hence undermines (horizontal) CBAs, whilst economic in-
tegration facilitates the fragmentation of a production process and ship intermediate goods
across the border, which would foster (vertical) CBAs (see Hijzen et al., 2008). We con-
trol for such effects by introducing a dummy variable for country-pairs located within the
same customs union (CU) as well as a measure of TRADE FREEDOM within a given
host country to proxy for the existence of formal and informal trade barriers. The political
and legal environment matters in the sense that MNEs are probably reluctant to invest in
countries with weak property rights for foreign investors, which is measured by an index on
INV ESTMENT FREEDOM . Aside from the quality of formal rules protecting foreign
investors, their enforcement might also matter. Wei (2000) finds indeed evidence that en-
demic CORRUPTION deters FDI.13 High CORPORATE TAXES in the host country
market size. However, since our specification includes a source country dummy variable δs absorbing the
effect of the home market size, employing the sum of the GDP between of the source and host country yields
an identical coefficient estimate.
12UBS (various years) also reports an index summarizing the labor cost across all 13 surveyed professions.
This WAGE INDEX will be used as robustness check when testing the nexus between labor cost and
vertical CBAs in Section 6.
13In general, the empirical literature has related FDI to a large number of so-called institutional quality
variables. However, most of these dimensions are closely correlated (Daude and Stein, 2007, pp.321ff.) and
seem to measure similar effects of whether or not a country has put in place economic, legal, or political
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relative to the source country could deter CBAs. The real EXCHANGE RATE affects
the relative price of a foreign acquisition (Froot and Stein, 1991). In particular, the cost of
a CBA increase with the relative value of the host country currency meaning that the ex-
pected effect is negative. Finally, the period under consideration has witnessed the creation
of the EURO zone, for which we control with a dummy variable (compare Coerdacier et al.,
2009). The data appendix contains an overview and a detailed description of all variables.
Since the possibility of diversification is largely ignored in the international economics lit-
erature, we are more agnostic about the theoretical priors for the determinants when con-
sidering their impact on conglomerate acquisitions. For example, economic integration or
improving institutional quality could facilitate the acquisition of foreign subsidiaries, but
also eliminate some of the frictions creating arbitrage opportunities for MNEs. Likewise,
economically large countries have more firms providing cross-border arbitrage opportunities,
but also imply that MNEs making an acquisition must compete with more domestic firms
with better access to information about the local economic and political conditions. Further-
more, as noted in Section 4, financial firms that are often located in financial centers with an
abundant supply of skilled labor are dominant acquirers in conglomerate CBAs. However,
to uncover evidence on the conjecture that financial arbitrage is a particularly important
motive for conglomerate CBAs, we will follow the work of Erel et al. (2012) in the finance
literature, which employs the difference of the country-level market-equity-to-book-equity
value ratio—or in short market-to-book ratio (MtB)—between source and host country.
The expectation is that this yields a positive effect on CBAs, since a higher valuation of the
source country companies puts them into the position to outpay foreign rivals when bidding
for a target firm abroad. Differences in valuation can arguably arise from two sources. A
first component, denoted by MtBm, reflects mis-pricing arising from errors in the valuation
as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (2003). A second unexpected component, denoted by
MtBw, reflects surprising developments that should come from real wealth effects featuring
in Froot and Stein (1991). To calculate these different components, we follow the method
of Baker et al. (2008) who regress the current MtB onto the future stock market returns
(see also Erel et al., 2012).14 The corresponding fitted value determines MtBm whilst the
residual determines MtBw. Finally, to uncover the empirical role of corporate governance,
Erel et al. (2012) and Rossi and Volpin (2004) use the difference of a SHAREHOLDER
RIGHTS index between the source and host country. The effect is positive when CBAs
tend to involve source countries with better corporate governance standards than the host
country.
5.2 Location Choices in a Conditional Logit Framework
Equation (1) forms the basis for our empirical strategy. However, only scant data is available
on the expected value νish,t of an acquisition. Though the price paid for a target firm could
provide a proxy for νish,t, in more than half of the deals, such information has not been
mechanisms protecting investors.
14The resulting regression equation equals MtBt = 2.194 − 0.048FRt+1(R2 = 0.42) where FR denotes
the future stock market return. With t-values of, respectively, 11.66 and 2.71 both coefficients are significant
at any conventionally used level of rejection. Estimation occurred with panel data and fixed effects for 18
countries. Extending the future stock returns to t+ 1 and t+ 2 leaves the results largely unchanged.
18
reported to SDC Platinum (Di Giovanni, 2005, p.134). Instead, the observation of Head and
Ries (2008) that acquisitions encapsulate a location choice within the market for corporate
control can be used to avoid this missing data problem. Indeed, insofar as a CBA deal
identifies the MNE of source country s deriving the highest expected value νisht of investing
in host country h in year t, this implies that
dish,t =
{
1 νish,t > ν
i
s′h′,t′
0 otherwise,
(2)
where s′, h′, t′ denote the choice set of, respectively, alternative source countries, host coun-
tries, or years to invest. Hence, location choices dsh,t constitute an almost universally ob-
served variable to uncover the impact of the set of explanatory variables xsh,t upon CBAs.
Econometric models that are capable to handle discrete choices include the conditional logit
model, where dish,t of (2) is the dependent variable (see e.g. Guimara˜es et al., 2003). Consis-
tent with the theoretical framework of Head and Ries (2008), conditional logit models draw
on the notion that a CBA identifies the MNE with the highest bid νisht implying that the
stochastic component sh,t of (1) follows a (type I) extreme value distribution. Within the
present context, the probability Psh,t of an acquisition involving source country s and host
country h during year t is then of the multinomial logit form, that is
P ish,t =
exp(x′sh,tβ + δh)∑S
s=1
∑H
h=1
∑T
t=1 exp
(
x′sh,tβ + δh)
) . (3)
Owing to the exponential form of (3), all components δi, δs and δt that are specific to,
respectively, a deal i, source country s, or year t drop out. Thus, only variables en-
ter xsh,t that differ across alternative host countries h. The joint distribution over all
deals i, source countries s, host countries h, and years t under consideration defines the
log likelihood function lnLcl =
∑N
i=1
∑S
s=1
∑H
h=1
∑T
t=1 ln(P
i
sh,t). A symmetric treatment
of deals implies that P ish,t = Psh,t, such that nsh,t can be factored out, that is lnLcl =∑S
s=1
∑H
h=1
∑T
t=1 nsh,t ln(Psh,t). Inserting (3) yields
lnLcl =
S∑
s=1
H∑
h=1
T∑
t=1
nsh,t(x
′
sh,tβ + δh)
−
S∑
s=1
H∑
h=1
T∑
t=1
[
nsh,t ln
( S∑
s=1
H∑
h=1
T∑
t=1
exp(x′sh,tβ + δh)
)]
, (4)
from which the coefficients β can be estimated.
According to Guimara˜es et al. (2003), a drawback of the conditional logit model is that the
estimation of (4) is unpractical when a large number of firms can choose to locate activities
in a large number of countries. Indeed, since our sample contains tens of thousands of
CBA deals which uncover the discrete choice from dozens of potential host countries, the
estimation of a conditional logit model would be burdensome, since it requires the handling
of a dataset with millions of observations.15
15Specifically, the number of observations is given by the product between the total number of deals N
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5.3 Empirical Implementation via the Poisson Regression
To avoid the caveats of the conditional logit model, the count variable nsh,t containing the
number of deals between source s and host country h during year t can be used as the
dependent variable instead of the discrete choice indicator dish,t per CBA deal i (Guimara˜es
et al., 2003). Basic count regressions impose a Poisson distribution on nsh,t, that is
Prob[n = nsh,t] =
exp(−λsh,t)λnsh,tsh,t
nsh,t!
, (5)
where λsh,t is the Poisson parameter. Count distributions give rise to a preponderance of
zero-valued observations that account naturally for the fact that more than 50 per cent of
source-host country pairs in our sample did not witness a CBA deal during a given year.
Furthermore, since a number nsh,t of acquisition events cannot adopt a negative value,
Poisson regressions employ an exponential mean transformation to connect the Poisson
parameter with the explanatory variables. For the present case with panel data containing
xsh,t as explanatory variables and the source country δs, host country δh, and year δt specific
constants, this yields
E[nsh,t] = λsh,t = exp(x
′
sh,tβ + δs + δh + δt) = αs,t exp(x
′
sh,tβ + δh). (6)
Here, αs,t = exp(δs + δt) absorbs the heterogeneity between pairs of source countries s and
years t. As shown by Guimara˜es et al. (2003), specifying αs,t as fixed effect and conditioning
this out of the joint distribution of (6) and (5) over all source countries s, host countries h,
and years t yields the (concentrated) log likelihood function
lnLpc =
S∑
s=1
H∑
h=1
T∑
t=1
nsh,t(x
′
sh,tβ + δh)
−
S∑
s=1
H∑
h=1
T∑
t=1
[
nsh,t ln
( S∑
s=1
H∑
h=1
T∑
t=1
exp(x′sh,tβ + δh)
)]
+ C. (7)
Since this differs from (4) only as regards the constant C, the estimates of the coefficients
β of such a panel Poisson regression are identical to those of the conditional logit model
(Guimara˜es et al., 2003).16 Aside from controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, employing
a fixed effects Poisson regression produces, here, the desired equivalence with the coefficient
estimates of the conditional logit model (4). Crucially, the source country and year-specific
constants contained in αs,t have to be treated as fixed effects in (6) and conditioned out
to produce the overlap between (4) and (7). Conversely, the constant δh pertaining to
the specific conditions in the host country appear as dummy variables in the fixed effects
Poisson regression. Reiterating the point made at the end of Section 5.2, the key advantage
of using a Poisson regression rather than the conditional logit model to estimate β is that
the aggregation of CBA deals into a count variable nsh,t results in a dramatic reduction of
the number of observations required for estimation.
and the set of host countries H.
16A derivation of this result is made available on request.
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Owing to different asymptotic assumptions, the overlap between the conditional logit model
and the Poisson count regression does not extend to the estimated standard deviations of β.
A discussion of this can be found in Schmidheiny and Bru¨lhart (2011, p.219). They show
that clustering at the group level produces identical standard errors that can be estimated
by block-wise bootstrapping, that is taking draws from blocks defined by αst.
It is well known that the coefficients β of a (nonlinear) Poisson regression are not an estimate
for the marginal effect. Rather, uncovering the marginal effect of a given variable x˜ksh,t upon
the expected number E[nsh,t] of CBAs warrants the calculation the elasticity ηsh,t. In
general, for the Poisson regression, the elasticity equals ηsh,t = βx˜
k
sh,t, which differs across
observations of x˜ksh,t. To facilitate the interpretation of our coefficients, all variables will
be transformed into deviations from their average values, that is xsh,t = x˜sh,t/xsh,t such
that the value of β reports directly the elasticity of the Poisson regression calculated at the
average conditions where xksh,t = 1.
6 Results
Based on the empirical strategy of Section 5, columns (1) to (4) of Table 5 report the
results of Poisson regressions upon the number nsh,t of CBAs between pairs of source and
host countries during a given year. Column (1) uses the full sample of CBAs whilst, for
the 5% value of V , columns (2) to (4) contain only the number of deals associated with,
respectively, the pure horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate acquisition strategies defined in
Section 3. The common sample covers the 1995 to 2010 period (mainly since the variables
INV ESTMENT FREEDOM , TRADE FREEDOM , and CORRUPTION only date
back to 1995) and involves an unbalanced panel with 25,446 observations across the 31
source s and 58 host h countries listed in the data appendix. All specifications include the
fixed effects αs,t and a full set of host-country dummy variables δh. Note that with these,
the interpretation of the coefficients relate to the importance of the variables beyond what
is captured by the conditions that are specific to countries or certain years. This mitigates
against finding spurious connections related e.g. to the observation of Table 2 that CBAs
are concentrated in large and developed countries. Hence, without dummy variables, a close
correlation between CBAs and economic size (GDP ) might just indicate that large countries
have, of course, a large number of potential acquiring and target firms.
Column (1) of Table 5 contains the results using all CBAs as the dependent variable. In total,
across all sectors, the common sample includes 126,481 deals. Recall that the interpretation
of the coefficients is not straightforward when their theoretical effect changes within a sample
where CBAs are driven by various investment strategies. For example, SKP , but not GDP ,
has a significant effect which would be consistent with vertical rather than horizontal motives
for multinational integration. Likewise, the significantly positive impact of customs unions
(CU) suggest that, across all deals, economic integration leads to more foreign acquisitions,
which is again consistent with a vertical strategy where the MNE exploits the possibility
to ship goods between the different plants of a geographically fragmented supply chain.
Aside from TRADE FREEDOM and INV ESTMENT COST , the other variables are
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significant with plausible effects in the sense that an MNE is more likely to acquire a firm
in nearby host countries, that share a common language and currency, have low levels of
corporate taxation and corruption, and a cheap currency.
The differences in significance of the explanatory variables provide us with a ”plausibility
check” of our method to disentangle the various acquisition strategies from CBA deals.
In particular, the theoretical literature ties horizontal strategies with the MNEs’ desire to
access markets whilst vertical strategies are thought to encapsulate the desire to outsource
production stages to low wage countries. This divergent effect lies clearly in evidence when
comparing the results of columns (2) and (3) of Table 5. In particular, column (2) with
horizontal CBAs gives rise to a highly significant entry of GDP , but an insignificant entry
of SWP , whilst, as expected, the converse situation arises in column (3) with vertical deals.
The coefficients of Table 5 provide direct evidence that the differences between horizontal
and vertical CBAs stipulated by established theories of the MNE manifest themselves in the
data.
While not central to our focus here, we briefly note that some of the other variables vary
across different categories. For example, conglomerate acquisitions are relatively sensitive to
corporate taxes; customs and currency unions appear to have a differential effect depending
on the acquisition strategy.
The differential impact of market size and the factor endowment difference variable on
horizontal and vertical CBAs turns out to be robust to several modifications of the results
of columns (2) and (3) of Table 5. Firstly, though Table 3 of Section 4 gave rise to a
substantial shift in the proportion of horizontal and vertical deals when lowering the cut-off
value V to 1%, this yields again coefficients that are consistent with the theoretical priors.
Conversely, with the 10% cut-off for V , SWP also significantly affects deals classified to
be horizontal. This could suggest that the 10% cut-off to define vertical relatedness is too
strict implying that some deals are classified as horizontal even though the acquiring and
target firm are connected through the supply chain. Secondly, as mentioned in Section 3,
deals between firms operating only in one industry, where ambiguities of finding multiple
horizontal or vertical overlaps cannot arise, account only for a small fraction of the sample.
In particular, in the 4,349 horizontal deals involving single industry firms, the market size
effect is again significantly positive whilst the effect of the skilled wage premium (SWP ) is
insignificant. Conversely, both effects are insignificant for the case of vertical deals between
single industry firms. The reason might be that this group only contains 1,462 deals or less
than 5 per cent of all vertical deals included in column (3) of Table 5. Thirdly, further to the
discussion of Section 3, we have also distinguished between cases where vertical integration
arises with the upstream and downstream stages of the supply chain. Again, a significantly
negative effect on the SKP but not on the market size variable arises regardless whether a
forward or backward vertical integration is considered. Fourthly, the key distinction between
horizontal and vertical CBAs holds also when we consider the somewhat broader defined
WAGE INDEX to reflect international differences in labor cost. For the sake of brevity,
the results of these sensitivity checks are not reported here, but are available on request.17
17In view of the caveats noted in Section 4, we do not report the detailed results for the residual (complex)
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As discussed above, the empirical literature on FDI has primarily focused on US MNEs
and/or the manufacturing sector, which provides, arguably, the background for theories on
horizontal and vertical FDI. Although a smaller sample inevitably ignores a large number
of deals and reduces the heterogeneity18 in the data, columns (5) to (8) of Table 5 follow
this literature by replicating our results for US acquisitions and target and acquiring firms
in the manufacturing sector (defined as primary SIC code = 2000 - 3999). This confirms our
key finding.19 In particular, market size (GDP ) impacts exclusively upon horizontal deals,
whilst international wage differences (SKP ) matter only for vertical deals. For column
(5) covering all strategies of multinational integration, a crucial difference to column (1) is
that both GDP and SWP are significant. It is perhaps not surprising that the industrial
motives embodied in market size and factor cost considerations apply more prominently to
the manufacturing sector.
Considering different samples did not overturn the essence of our results. In particular, the
further robustness checks pertain to a sample containing only deals with US firms as acquirer
or target, to reflect that the technology inherent in the input-output tables defining vertical
relatedness in Section 3 refers to the US. As regards the distinction between developed (high
income) and developing (low and middle income) countries mentioned in Section 3, intuitive
differences arise. Specifically, with deals within the developed world, which account for
around 75 per cent of all activity, there is no longer a significant impact of international
wage differences upon vertical CBAs. This is perhaps not surprising since outsourcing labor
intensive production stages typically involves developing countries and emerging markets
where wages are low. Contemplating deals from developed to developing countries confirmed
this. Finally, as regards foreign acquisitions, China might be special case in the sense that a
joint venture component is traditionally required in foreign investment. However, excluding
the corresponding observations from the sample barely changed the coefficient estimates.
For the sake of brevity, the results of these sensitivity checks are not reported here, but are
available on request.
Table 6 adds explanatory variables measuring the differences in market-to-book (MtB)
ratios between source and host country to reflect the possibility of financial arbitrage con-
sidered by Erel et al. (2012), and the differences in SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS to reflect
the governance motive of CBAs considered by Rossi and Volpin (2004). Recall that the
market-to-book ratio was split into a component measuring mis-valuation (MtBm) and a
component measuring a relative wealth effect (MtBw). The corresponding data are only
available for 18 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom, United States). Hence, the sample with which we can test the financial arbitrage
and governance motive contains only about one fifth of the observations used to calculate
group. However, in case of considering the 5 per cent value for V , the impact of GDP was insignificant
whilst SWP gave rise to a significant coefficient. However, this result was not robust to considering different
cut-off values (V ), which, perhaps, underscores the non-pure nature of these deals combining horizontal
and/or vertical elements.
18In particular, due to the lack of heterogeneity, the variables CU and EURO drop out.
19The same can also be said when contemplating the results for the manufacturing sector across all source
countries in our sample.
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the results of Table 5 above. Nevertheless, aside from the lower significance of some coeffi-
cients that can be attributed to the reduced heterogeneity within a sample containing only
developed countries, the impact of the common variables between the Table 5 and Table 6
is by and large similar. One notable difference is that a slightly significant effect arises with
the SWP with horizontal CBAs in column 2 of Table 5. However, when considering the 1%
benchmark for V , which is a stricter criterion to identify horizontal deals, the significant
effect of GDP and insignificant effect of SWP arises concurring with the theoretical prior.
The results of column (1) of Table 6 suggest that mis-valuation (MtBw) impacts signifi-
cantly upon the number of CBAs. Within the spirit of finance driven acquisitions proposed
by Shleifer and Vishny (1993), aside from the conventional economic and geographical vari-
ables introduced above, CBAs can apparently also reflect the desire to exploit the relative
undervaluation of target firms abroad. Contemplating the differences between columns (2)
to (4), it is perhaps not surprising that a statistically significant effect of MtBm arises only
with conglomerate deals, where the coefficient, with an elasticity above one, is also econom-
ically large.2021 Furthermore, recall from Figure 4 that large parts of diversifying CBAs
involve financial sector acquirers which, apparently, target undervalued firms to make arbi-
trage profits by exploiting international valuation differences. The effect of MtBm is also
consistent with the discussion around Figure 5, according to which merger waves manifest
themselves primarily in the changes of conglomerate CBA activity. Through the mis-pricing
effect, the burgeoning financial market at the end of the 1990s and before the global finan-
cial may have transmitted into the international market for corporate control. Conversely,
the relative wealth effects inherent in MtBw are neither significant nor are they econom-
ically important. Maybe, relative wealth effects are more important for specific firms or
industries, but average out across aggregated counts of CBAs used here as the dependent
variable. Finally, the corporate governance motive suggested by Rossi and Volpin (2004)
matters regardless the pursued acquisition strategy in the sense that CBAs are likely to
involve source countries offering relatively higher investor protection than the host country.
20To analyze the effect of financial variables on CBAs, Di Giovanni (2005) has looked at the impact
of financial market size, measured by the capitalization of the domestic stock market relative to GDP.
Crucially, his specification focuses on the degree of financial deepening in the source country emphasizing
’the importance of domestic financial conditions in stimulating international investment’ (p.127). However,
as discussed in Section 5, our location choice approach absorbs source country-specific variables such as the
size of the domestic stock market in the fixed effect αs,t. One way to relax this would be to drop fixed
effects and introduce financial deepening as an additional variable in a random effects Poisson regression.
The corresponding results are consistent with the picture of Table 6. Crucially, financial deepening in the
source country drives CBAs in general. However, this effect arises principally through the conglomerate
part. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the detailed results, which are, however, available on request.
21Instead of following Baker et al. (2009) and Erel et al. (2012) and calculate the mis-pricing regression
of footnote 15 with country-level MtBs, it would in principle also be possible to construct aggregate MtBs
from the firms involved in CBA deals. As emphasized in Erel et al. (2012, pp. 1060ff.), the downside
of this is that MtBs are available for publicly traded firms, which represent only a small part of the full
sample. For our case, in around three quarters of the deals, detailed financial information is not available
for both the acquirer and the target firm. Calculating nevertheless an aggregate MtB from the quarter
of deals where we have the corresponding information and rerunning the regression of footnote 15 yields
MtBt = 4.5310.01FRt+1 (R2=0.31) with t-values of 25.5 and 1.21, respectively. Proceeding by calculating
the mis-pricing and wealth components and plugging them into the regressions of Table 6 gave rise to a
positive and significant effect for MtBm (with a coefficient of around 1.5) and an insignificant effect for
MtBw. Yet, the different effect across FDI strategies disappeared. Perhaps, this suggests that financial
arbitrage opportunities exploited via conglomerate CBAs arise mainly via the acquisition of non-public (or
non-listed) firms.
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Table 6: Adding Financial Arbitrage and Governance Motives
All CBA Horizontal CBA Vertical CBA Conglomerate
CBA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP -0.005 0.130** 0.031 -0.138**
(0.045) (0.061) (0.055) (0.051)
SWP 0.201*** 0.176* 0.284*** 0.165*
(0.060) (0.090) (0.080) (0.085)
Distance -0.883*** -0.964*** -0.858*** -0.904***
(0.037) (0.048) (0.036) (0.041)
Language 0.160*** 0.179*** 0.157*** 0.157***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
CU 0.127*** 0.069* 0.086*** 0.190***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030)
Trade Freedom -0.496 0.543 -0.571 -0.955*
(0.550) (0.714) (0.649) (0.525)
Investment Fd. 0.040 -0.232 0.113 0.078
(0.148) (0.185) (0.154) (0.174)
Corruption 0.057 0.096 0.132 -0.012
(0.102) (0.137) (0.109) (0.104)
Corporate Tax -0.273* -0.145 -0.131 -0.381**
(0.141) (0.155) (0.135) (0.156)
Exchange Rate -0.626*** -0.725*** -0.841*** -0.512**
(0.178) (0.184) (0.213) (0.217)
Euro 0.026*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.011
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
MtBm 0.929* 0.769 0.533 1.318**
(0.496) (0.537) (0.457) (0.647)
MtBw 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0001 0.00002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Shareh. Rights 0.138*** 0.115** 0.176*** 0.135**
(0.045) (0.053) (0.056) (0.056)
αs,t yes yes yes yes
δh yes yes yes yes
#cba 81,121 15,329 23,859 29,092
#obspc 4,896 4,896 4,896 4,896
lnLpc -16,851 -7,018 -8,697 -9,811
Notes: The dependent variable is the number (count) of CBAs nsh,t. Estimation of the
panel Poisson regression with fixed effect αst is by maximum likelihood. All explanatory
variables have been transformed into deviations from their mean. Hence, the coefficient
estimates represent an elasticity, that is the percentage change of nsh,t when an explanatory
variable, at its average value, changes by one per cent. The 5% cut-off level is used for V
to define FDI strategies. The data cover a common sample of CBAs for the 1995 to 2010
period and include observations from 18 (source and host) countries. Furthermore, #cba
is the number of deals, #obs is the number of observations, and lnL the value of the log
likelihood function. Block bootstrapped robust standard errors are reported in parantheses;
100 replications (blocks defined by αs,t). * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the
5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
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7 Summary and Conclusion
This paper has employed a large panel encompassing a near-universal coverage of cross-
border acquisitions (CBAs) relating to 31 source and 58 host countries across the 1990
to 2011 period to address the alternative forms CBAs may take. For our dataset, using
detailed information on all the industrial affiliations of the acquiring and target firm, we
can directly identify horizontal and vertical linkages for each CBA deal. Consistent with
the priors of the literature on the MNE, we find that the number of horizontal CBAs, where
target and acquiring firm operate within identical industries that are unrelated through the
supply chain, tends to increase with the market size of the involved countries. Conversely,
international differences in labor cost affect vertical CBAs, where the acquiring and target
firms operate in different industries that are connected through the supply chain. Strategies
that neither involve horizontal nor vertical motives have, by and large, been ignored in the
literature or, at least, inadequately accounted for. However, we find that such conglomerate
strategies are far from uncommon and, even with generous definitions for horizontal and
vertical relatedness, account for more than one fifth of the CBA deals in our sample. We
find such conglomerate CBAs to be strongly driven by financial arbitrage opportunities when
MNEs invest in countries where firms are undervalued.
Moving beyond the conventional distinction between horizontal and vertical strategies opens,
in our view, several avenues to reappraise the role of MNEs in the global economy. In par-
ticular, since the established theories of the MNE draw primarily on motives associated
with the proximity concentration trade-off arising with horizontal, and factor cost savings
arising with vertical strategies, research giving more prominence to financial and other non-
industrial motives might be warranted. Related to this, given that FDI is associated with
potential advantages to the host country, it would be important to identify the potential
benefits (if any) resulting from conglomerate strategies. Furthermore, though a substantial
part of CBAs does reflect horizontal and vertical strategies, they seem to be ill-equipped to
explain the marked surges in international merger activity since key variables such as market
size or relative wages change only gradually. Conversely, the financial variables that can be
tied with the considerable number of deals underpinned by conglomerate strategies exhibit
the wave-like behavior to sustain the volatility in the international market for corporate
control. Hence, they might be important to better explain the time profile of FDI. Future
empirical research could try to further analyze these and other issues e.g. by exploiting de-
tailed firm-level data that might be available for certain countries and/or sectors or studying
the spillover effects of various FDI strategies. Finally, to the extent that the ’pecking order’
of international financial flows rests, among other things, on the alleged more stable behavior
of FDI, acknowledging that conglomerate strategies might drive a substantial part of CBAs
questions, maybe, some of the alleged advantages of FDI over portfolio investment.
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Country Coverage
The common sample covers the following countries. Wage data of UBS (various years) refer
to the cities in parentheses:
As source: Australia (Sydney), Austria (Vienna), Belgium (Brussels), Brazil (Sao Paulo),
Canada (Toronto), China (Shanghai), Czech Republic (Prague), Denmark (Copenhagen),
Finland (Helsinki), France (Paris), Germany (Frankfurt), Greece (Athens), Hongkong (Hongkong),
Hungary (Budapest), Indonesia (Djakarta), Ireland (Dublin), Italy (Milan), Japan (Tokyo),
Mexico (Mexico City), Netherlands (Amsterdam), Norway (Oslo), Poland (Warsaw), Portu-
gal (Lisbon), Russia (Moscow), Singapore (Singapore), South Africa (Johannesburg), Spain
(Madrid), Sweden (Stockholm), Switzerland (Zurich), United Kingdom (London), United
States (Washington).
The common sample covers the following host countries. Wage data of UBS (various years)
refer to the cities in parentheses:
As host: Argentina (Buenos Aires), Australia (Sydney), Austria (Vienna), Bahrain (Man-
ama), Belgium (Brussels), Brazil (Sao Paulo), Bulgaria (Sofia), Canada (Toronto), Chile
(Santiago de Chile), China (Shanghai), Colombia (Bogota), Czech Republic (Prague), Cyprus
(Nikosia), Denmark (Copenhagen), Estonia (Tallinn), Finland (Helsinki), France (Paris),
Germany (Frankfurt), Greece (Athens), Hongkong(Hongkong), Hungary (Budapest), India
(Mumbai), Indonesia (Djakarta), Ireland (Dublin), Israel (Tel Aviv), Italy (Milan), Japan
(Tokyo), Kenya (Nairobi), Korea (Seoul), Latvia (Riga), Lithuania (Vilnius), Luxembourg
(Luxembour), Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), Mexico (Mexico City), Netherlands (Amsterdam),
New Zealand (Auckland), Norway (Oslo), Panama (Panama), Peru (Lima), Philippines
(Manila), Poland (Warsaw), Portugal (Lisbon), Romania (Bucharest), Russia (Moscow),
Singapore (Singapore), Slovak Republic (Bratislava), Slovenia (Ljubliana), South Africa (Jo-
hannesburg), Spain (Madrid), Sweden (Stockholm), Switzerland (Zurich), Thailand (Bangkok),
Turkey (Istanbul), Ukraine (Kiev), United Arab Emirates (Dubai), United Kingdom (Lon-
don), United States (Washington), Venezuela (Caracas).
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Table 7: Description of the Data Set
Variable Description Source
Dependent
Variables:
CBA Number of international merger deals between the source
country s and host countries h during year t. The horizon-
tal, vertical, and conglomerate modes defined in this are
described in the text.
Compiled from
SDC Platinum
of Thomson
Financial.
Covariates:
CORPORATE
TAXES
Statutory tax rate on corporate income in country h during
year t.
KPMG, Corpo-
rate and Indirect
Tax Rate Survey
(various years).
CORRUPTION Corruption index on a scale from 10 to 90. Original val-
ues have been reversed such that higher values mean more
corruption. For the year 1995 the values for Belgium, Fin-
land, Netherlands and Norway are not available and the
values of 1996 have been used.
Heritage Founda-
tion.
CU Nominal variable for source and host countries that are
member of a customs union.
World Trade
Organization:
Regional Trade
Agreements
(RTA) Database.
DISTANCE Great circular distance between Washington DC and the
capital city of the host country in terms of logarithmically
transformed thousand Km.
Compiled from
www.chemical-
ecology.net/java/
capitals.htm.
EURO Nominal variable for source and host countries sharing the
Euro as common currency.
EXCHANGE
RATE
Real exchange rate (an increase is an appreciation of the
source country currency). Calculated from by dividing
the nominal exchange rate with with the PPP factor over
GDP.
Penn World Ta-
bles.
GDP Market size of the source and host country as measured
by the real Gross Domestic Product denominated in US$
with base year 2000.
World Develop-
ment Indicators
(WDI) of the
World Bank.
INVESTMENT
FREEDOM
Index of freedom of investment referring to whether there
is a foreign investment code that defines the country’s in-
vestment laws and procedures; whether the government
encourages foreign investment through fair and equitable
treatment of investors; whether there are restrictions on
access to foreign exchange; whether foreign firms are
treated the same as domestic firms under the law whether
the government imposes restrictions on payments, trans-
fers, and capital transactions; and whether specific indus-
tries are closed to foreign investment. For the year 1995
the values for Belgium, Finland, Netherlands and Norway
are not available and the values of 1996 have been used.
Higher values mean more freedom.
Heritage Founda-
tion.
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Further Co-
variates:
LANGUAGE Countries sharing a common official language. Compiled from
CIA World
Factbook.
MtBm Difference in the mis-valuation component of market to
book ration between source and host country. Mis-
valuation is calculated by regressing the future stock mar-
ket return on current values of the MtB and calculating
the fitted values. See Baker et al. (2008) for the details of
this method
Compiled from
Datastream.
MtBw Difference in the wealth component of market to book ra-
tion between source and host country. The wealth com-
ponent is calculated by regressing the future stock market
return on current values of the MtB and calculating the
residual. See Baker et al. (2008) for the details of this
method
Compiled from
Datastream.
SHAREHOLDER
RIGHTS
Difference in shareholder rights between the source and
host country. Shareholder rights are measured by an anti-
directors rights index reflecting (i) the possibility of share-
holders to mail their proxy vote, (ii) whether shareholders
are required to deposit their shares prior to the General
Shareholders Meeting (iii) whether cumulative voting is
allowed (iv) an oppressed minorities mechanism exists (5)
whether the minimum stake allowing shareholders to call
for an extraordinary shareholders meeting is more or less
than 10%. Higher values mean more power for sharehold-
ers.
La Porta et al.
(1998)
SWP Skilled wage premium in host host country. Wages of
skilled and unskilled labor refer to the hourly salaries of,
respectively, department heads and factory workers as paid
in the capital city or the financial center of a country. Data
are published on a tri-annual basis (1994, 1997, 2000, 2003,
2006, 2009). Values of missing years have been filled with
the closest observation.
Braconier et al.
(2005), UBS
Prices and Earn-
ings (various
years).
TRADE FREE-
DOM
Index of freedom of international trade (tariff and non-
tariff barriers) on a scale from 10 to 90. For the year 1995
the values for Belgium, Finland, Netherlands and Norway
are not available and the values of 1996 have been used.
Higher values mean more freedom.
Heritage Founda-
tion.
WAGE INDEX Wage in the host country net of compulsory social secu-
rity contributions. Wages are measured by an index re-
ferring to the hourly income of 13 comparable professions
(product managers, department heads, engineers, primary
school teachers, bus drivers, car mechanics, building labor-
ers, industrial workers, cooks, bank credit officers, personal
assistants, sales assistants, factory workers) as paid in the
capital city or the financial center of a country. Data are
published on a tri-annual basis. Values of the missing years
have been filled with the closest observation available.
UBS, Prices and
Earnings.
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A Reviewers’ Appendix
A.1 Derivations: Log-Likelihood of Fixed Effects Poisson Count
Regression
To derive the fixed effects estimator for Poisson regressions, Guimaraes et al. (2003) use a
maximum likelihood approach estimating the coefficients (β) simultaneously with the fixed
effects αst. Using (5) to calculate the likelihood function yields
lnL(αst, β) =
S∑
s=1
H∑
h=1
T∑
t=1
ln
[
exp(−λsh,t)λnsh,tsh,t
nsh,t!
]
. (8)
Inserting (6) gives
lnL(αst, β) =
S∑
s=1
T∑
t=1
[
−αst
H∑
h=1
exp(x′sh,tβ+δh)+lnαst
H∑
h=1
nsh,t+
H∑
h=1
nsh,t(x
′
sh,tβ+δh)−
H∑
h=1
nsh,t!
]
.
(9)
Differentiating this with respect to αst and setting to 0 yields
α̂st =
∑
h nsh,t∑
h exp
(
x′sh,tβ + δh
) . (10)
Substituting this back into (9) yields the concentrated likelihood function of (7), that is
lnL(β, τ) =
S∑
s=1
H∑
h=1
T∑
t=1
nsh,t(x
′
sh,tβ+δh)−
S∑
s=1
H∑
h=1
T∑
t=1
[
nsh,t ln
( S∑
s=1
H∑
h=1
T∑
t=1
exp(x′sh,tβ+δh)
)]
+C,
where C =
∑S
s=1
∑H
h=1
∑T
t=1 nsh,t +
∑S
s=1
∑H
h=1
∑T
t=1 nsh,t!.
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A.2 Details on classification of CBAs
This appendix clarifies the method to classify each CBA deal according to the underlying
strategy (horizontal, vertical, conglomerate, or residual (complex)). As mentioned in Section
3, the stepping stone for this classification is the industrial affiliation reported in SDC
Platinum by the acquiring firm and target firm in terms of SIC codes denoted by, respectively,
SICρα and SIC
σ
τ . Reflecting the potential for multi-business activity, SDC reports up to 6
different SIC codes, that is ρ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and σ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. Hence, there are up
to 6× 6 = 36 pairs of SIC codes that might exhibit industrial linkages.
As explained in detail in Section 3, industrial linkages can arise horizontally and vertically.
Specifically, horizontal linkages arise when two SIC codes are identical (at the 4-digit level),
that is SICρα = SIC
σ
τ , whilst a vertical relationship arises when industries differ (SIC
ρ
α 6=
SICστ ), but are connected through the supply chain in the sense that the vertical relatedness
coefficient V ρσατ between a pair of industries exceeds the value of given cut-off level, that is
V ρσατ > V . Given these definitions, it is impossible that a specific pair of SIC codes exhibits
both horizontal and vertical relationships. However, a pair can neither be horizontally, nor
vertically related when SICρα 6= SICστ and V ρσατ < V .
Against this background, we classify a CBA as ’purely horizontal’ when there is at least
one horizontal linkage, but no vertical linkage across all paired combinations of SIC codes
reported by the acquiring and target firm. We classify a CBA as ’purely vertical’ when
there is at least one vertical linkage, but no horizontal linkage across all combinations of
SIC codes. We classify a CBA as ’purely conglomerate’ when there are neither horizontal
nor vertical linkages across all combinations of SIC codes. All other cases (where there are
both horizontal and vertical connections in a deal) are assigned to the residual (complex)
group. Table 1 of the paper provides a more formal definition of the strategies of CBAs.
The following illustrates our classification method with some examples. Consider first the
case of single-business firms that report only one SIC code. Following the definition of
industrial relationships above, suppose that the combination of these SIC codes exhibit
either a horizontal (denoted by H), vertical (denoted by V), or none of these connections
(denoted by 0). Reporting the SIC code of the acquirer in the raw and the SIC code of the
target firm in the column of a 1 × 1 matrix gives rise to the following potential cases (or
CBA strategies):
Horizontal Vertical ConglomerateResidual (complex)
SIC target With single-business firms the
SIC ac-
quirer
(H) (V) (0) residual (complex) case cannot
arise. No ’non-pure’ combina-
tion of horizontal and vertical re-
lationships is possible when there
is only one pair of SICs.
Things get more complicated when we allow for multi-business activity, where the acquirer
and target report several SIC codes. In particular, there can be ’non-pure’ residual (or com-
plex) deals where both horizontal and vertical connections arise. However, considering for
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the sake of simplicity a scenario with 2 different SIC codes (extensions to more combinations
are straightforward) and reporting, again, the SIC codes of the acquirer in the raw and the
SIC codes of the target firm in the column of a 2 × 2 matrix gives rise to the following
non-exhaustive list of examples of CBA strategies:
Horizontal Vertical Conglomerate Residual
(complex)
SIC codes of target firm in columns
S
IC
co
d
es
a
cq
u
irer
fi
rm
in
row
s
Example 1
(
H 0
0 0
) (
V 0
0 0
) (
0 0
0 0
) (
V 0
0 H
)
Example 2
(
0 H
H 0
) (
0 0
0 V
) (
0 V
H H
)
Example 3
(
H H
0 0
) (
V 0
V 0
) (
H H
V H
)
Example 4
(
H H
H H
) (
0 V
V V
) (
H V
0 H
)
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A.3 Robustness Checks mentioned in the Paper
Table 8: Robustness Checks I: Different cut-off Levels for Vertical Relatedness
1 % for V 10 % for V
Horizontal CBAs Vertical CBAs Horizontal CBAs Vertical CBAs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP 0.117*** 0.005 0.058*** -0.001
(0.038) (0.020) (0.019) (0.031)
SWP 0.290 0.915** 0.629*** 1.054***
(0.320) (0.207) (0.189) (0.298)
Distance -1.347*** -1.073*** -1.203*** -0.949***
(0.054) (0.037) (0.038) (0.045)
Language 0.104*** 0.090*** 0.102*** 0.066***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
CU 0.015 0.059*** 0.015 0.053***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Trade Freedom -0.004 0.031 0.051 0.055
(0.072) (0.046) (0.040) (0.117)
Investment Fd. -0.102 0.051 -0.0002 0.088
(0.134) (0.088) (0.091) (0.170)
Corruption -0.093 -0.132** -0.153** -0.105
(0.088) (0.068) (0.065) (0.097)
Corporate Tax. -0.511*** -0.354*** -0.347*** -0.130
(0.122) (0.087) (0.088) (0.134)
Exchange Rate -0.501*** -0.453*** -0.543*** -0.388***
(0.103) (0.068) (0.066) (0.084)
Euro 0.013*** 0.005* 0.007** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.00*) (0.004)
αs,t yes yes yes yes
δh yes yes yes yes
#cba 9,778 71,219 44,911 14,178
#obs 25,446 25,446 25,446 25,446
lnL -10,745 -34,706 -26,412 -14,455
Notes: The dependent variable is the number (count) of CBAs nsh,t. Estimation of the panel
Poisson regression with fixed effect αs,t is by maximum likelihood. All explanatory variables have
been transformed into deviations from their mean. Hence, the coefficient estimates represent an
elasticity, that is the percentage change of nsh,t when an explanatory variable, at its average value,
changes by one per cent. The data cover a common sample of CBAs for the 1995 to 2010 period
and include observations from 31 source and 58 host countries. Furthermore, #cba is the number
of deals, #obs is the number of observations, and lnL the value of the log likelihood function.
Bootstrapped standard errors (clustered by αst) are reported in parantheses. * Significant at the
10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 10: Robustness Checks III: Residual (complex) Deals
1 % for V 5 % for V 10 % for V
(1) (2) (3)
GDP 0.037* 0.027 0.031
(0.021) (0.021) (0.027)
SWP (Wage) 0.598*** 0.809*** 0.525**
(0.163) (0.183) (0.267)
Distance -1.090*** -1.032*** -0.977***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.036)
Language 0.088*** 0.080*** 0.073***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
CU 0.025** 0.047*** 0.069***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Trade Freedom 0.035 0.046 -0.016
(0.045) (0.056) (0.086)
Investment Fd. -0.085 0.026 -0.095
(0.115) (0.119) (0.139)
Corruption -0.194** -0.265*** -0.212**
(0.079) (0.088) (0.107)
Corporate Tax. -0.217 -0.332*** -0.201**
(0.136) (0.124) (0.140)
Exchange Rate -0.452*** -0.363*** -0.168**
(0.065) (0.070) (0.091)
Euro 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
αs,t yes yes yes
δh yes yes yes
#cba 20,835 20,763 11,393
#obs 25,446 25,446 25,446
lnL -17,301 -7,714 -12,961
Notes: The dependent variable is the number (count) of CBAs nsh,t within the manufactur-
ing sector (SIC 2000-3999). Estimation of the panel Poisson regression with fixed effect αs,t
is by maximum likelihood. All explanatory variables have been transformed into deviations
from their mean. Hence, the coefficient estimates represent an elasticity, that is the percent-
age change of nsh,t when an explanatory variable, at its average value, changes by one per
cent. The 5% cut-off level is used for V to define FDI strategies. The data cover a common
sample of CBAs for the 1995 to 2010. Furthermore, #cba is the number of deals, #obs is
the number of observations, and lnL the value of the log likelihood function. Bootstrapped
standard errors (clustered by αst) are reported in parantheses. * Significant at the 10%
level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 11: Robustness Checks IV: Manufacturing Sector
All CBAs Hor. CBAs Vertical CBAs Conglom. CBA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP 0.083*** 0.097*** 0.009 0.041*
(0.017) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023)
SWP (Wage) 0.983*** 0.405 1.367*** 1.005***
(0.162) (0.346) (0.248) (0.299)
Distance -1.009*** -1.081*** -0.992*** -1.026***
(0.031) (0.060) (0.039) (0.046)
Language 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.082***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
CU 0.026** -0.003 0.038*** 0.019
(0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
Trade Freedom 0.052 0.098 0.118* 0.079
(0.031) (0.075) (0.061) (0.082)
Investment Fd. -0.061 -0.146 -0.103 -0.044
(0.073) (0.161) (0.104) (0.173)
Corruption -0.215*** -0.178 -0.045 -0.268**
(0.062) (0.112) (0.089) (0.112)
Corporate Tax. -0.155 0.156 -0.278** -0.031
(0.099) (0.135) (0.112) (0.135)
Exchange Rate -0.212*** -0.108 -0.209** -0.278**
(0.075) (0.089) (0.103) (0.142)
Euro 0.004 0.004 0.011*** 0.002
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
αs,t yes yes yes yes
δh yes yes yes yes
#cba 31,076 6,042 9,542 5,555
#obs 25,446 25,446 25,446 25,446
lnL -20,174 -7,714 -9,980 -6,355
Notes: The dependent variable is the number (count) of CBAs nsh,t within the manufactur-
ing sector (SIC 2000-3999). Estimation of the panel Poisson regression with fixed effect αs,t
is by maximum likelihood. All explanatory variables have been transformed into deviations
from their mean. Hence, the coefficient estimates represent an elasticity, that is the percent-
age change of nsh,t when an explanatory variable, at its average value, changes by one per
cent. The 5% cut-off level is used for V to define FDI strategies. The data cover a common
sample of CBAs for the 1995 to 2010. Furthermore, #cba is the number of deals, #obs is
the number of observations, and lnL the value of the log likelihood function. Bootstrapped
standard errors (clustered by αst) are reported in parantheses. * Significant at the 10%
level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 13: Robustness Checks VI: Exclude China as a Host Country
All CBAs Horizontal
CBAs
Vertical CBAs Conglomerate
CBA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP -0.007 0.058** -0.002 -0.049**
(0.018) (0.026) (0.027) (0.020)
SWP 0.211 -0.277 0.606*** 0.177
(0.158) (0.278) (0.229) (0.201)
Distance -1.077*** -1.245*** -1.010*** -1.085***
(0.029) (0.047) (0.034) (0.038)
Language 0.088*** 0.103*** 0.082*** 0.089***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
CU 0.051*** 0.006 0.046*** 0.082***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Trade Freedom 0.061 0.046 0.101 0.032
(0.042) (0.048) (0.079) (0.044)
Investment Fd. 0.132 0.039 0.121 0.186*
(0.092) (0.104) (0.115) (0.100)
Corruption -0.121** -0.067 -0.077 -0.134**
(0.063) (0.059) (0.074) (0.091)
Corporate Taxes -0.315*** -0.222** -0.301*** -0.397***
(0.083) (0.095) (0.100) (0.112)
Exchange Rate -0.465*** -0.546*** -0.490*** -0.446***
(0.062) (0.084) (0.074) (0.064)
Euro 0.005** 0.008*** 0.010*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
αs,t yes yes yes yes
δh yes yes yes yes
#cba 121,344 23,529 34,891 43,028
#obs 24,996 24,996 24,996 24,996
lnL -46,683 -18,520 -22,019 -25,110
Notes: The dependent variable is the number (count) of CBAs nsh,t. Estimation of the
panel Poisson regression with fixed effect αs,t is by maximum likelihood. All explanatory
variables have been transformed into deviations from their mean. Hence, the coefficient
estimates represent an elasticity, that is the percentage change of nsh,t when an explanatory
variable, at its average value, changes by one per cent. The 5% cut-off level is used for V
to define FDI strategies. The data cover a common sample of CBAs for the 1995 to 2010
period and include observations from 31 source and 58 host countries. Furthermore, #cba
is the number of deals, #obs is the number of observations, and lnL the value of the log
likelihood function. Block bootstrapped robust standard errors are reported in parantheses;
100 replications (blocks defined by αst). * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the
5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 14: Robustness Checks VII: Adding Financial Deepening
All CBA Horizontal CBA Vertical CBA Conglomerate
CBA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP 0.006 0.177*** 0.066 -0.109*
(0.045) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055)
SWP 0.197*** 0.151* 0.267*** 0.155**
(0.062) (0.086) (0.078) (0.072)
Distance -0.882*** -0.953*** -0.853*** -0.898***
(0.037) (0.046) (0.036) (0.043)
Language 0.161*** 0.183*** 0.160*** 0.160***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
CU 0.124*** 0.059** 0.077*** 0.181***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.033)
Trade Freedom -0.447 0.695 -0.413 -0.833
(0.483) (0.608) (0.664) (0.592)
Investment Fd. 0.028 -0.304 0.073 0.049
(0.134) (0.193) (0.164) (0.207)
Corruption 0.058 0.099 0.133 -0.010
(0.078) (0.141) (0.126) (0.099)
Corporate Taxes -0.347** -0.505*** -0.372** -0.563***
(0.137) (0.171) (0.164) (0.187)
Exchange Rate -0.611*** -0.625*** -0.779*** -0.475**
(0.176) (0.178) (0.180) (0.189)
Euro 0.026*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.011
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
MtBm 0.954* 0.853 0.637 1.368**
(0.492) (0.550) (0.519) (0.583)
MtBw 0.0001 0.0006 -0.0001 0.00004
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Stock Market 0.581** 0.371 0.477* 0.780***
Cap/GDP (0.247) (0.259) (0.244) (0.274)
Shareh. Rights 0.153*** 0.176*** 0.222*** 0.177***
(0.047) (0.056) (0.057) (0.055)
αs,t yes yes yes yes
δh yes yes yes yes
#cba 81,121 15,329 23,859 29,092
#obspc 4,896 4,896 4,896 4,896
lnLpc -18,775 -8,450 -10,271 -11,440
Notes: The dependent variable is the number (count) of CBAs nsh,t. Estimation of the
panel Poisson regression with random effect αst is by maximum likelihood. All explanatory
variables have been transformed into deviations from their mean. Hence, the coefficient
estimates represent an elasticity, that is the percentage change of nsh,t when an explanatory
variable, at its average value, changes by one per cent. The 5% cut-off level is used for V
to define FDI strategies. The data cover a common sample of CBAs for the 1995 to 2010
period and include observations from 18 (source and host) countries. Furthermore, #cba
is the number of deals, #obs is the number of observations, and lnL the value of the log
likelihood function. Block bootstrapped robust standard errors are reported in parantheses;
100 replications (blocks defined by αs,t). * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the
5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
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A.4 Further Robustness Checks requested by Reviewer#2
Table 15: Robustness Checks VIII: Alfaro and Charlton Specification (Manufacturing Sector,
Year 2005)
All CBAs Hor. CBAs Vertical CBAs Conglom. CBA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP 0.443* -1.714 0.344 0.734
(0.230) (114.0) (1.220) (0.557)
SWP (Wage) 8.418 159.2 9.402 -2.374
(5.883) (9090) (31.70) (11.50)
Distance -1.295*** -1.269*** -1.398*** -1.092***
(0.211) (0.136) (0.344) (0.239)
αs,t yes yes yes yes
δh yes yes yes yes
#cba 8,068 3,043 1,552 2,246
#obs 25,446 25,446 25,446 25,446
lnL -1,342 -488.5 -654.5 -392.5
Notes: The dependent variable is the number (count) of CBAs nsh,t within the manufactur-
ing sector (SIC 2000-3999). Estimation of the panel Poisson regression with fixed effect αs,t
is by maximum likelihood. All explanatory variables have been transformed into deviations
from their mean. Hence, the coefficient estimates represent an elasticity, that is the percent-
age change of nsh,t when an explanatory variable, at its average value, changes by one per
cent. The 5% cut-off level is used for V to define FDI strategies. The data cover a common
sample of CBAs for the 1995 to 2010. Furthermore, #cba is the number of deals, #obs is
the number of observations, and lnL the value of the log likelihood function. Bootstrapped
standard errors (clustered by αst) are reported in parantheses. * Significant at the 10%
level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 16: Robustness Checks IX: Value Data
All CBAs Horizontal
CBAs
Vertical CBAs Conglomerate
CBA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP 0.174 0.170 0.216 0.144
(0.108) (0.123) (0.189) (0.220)
SWP 1.207 0.906 0.831 2.303**
(0.838) (1.228) (0.941) (1.085)
Distance -0.228*** -0.861*** 0.018 -0.146***
(0.088) (0.159) (0.137) (0.044)
Language 0.013 0.057** 0.025 0.014
(0.015) (0.025) (0.023) (0.015)
CU 0.152*** 0.101 0.375*** -0.107*
(0.055) (0.069) (0.110) (0.060)
Trade Freedom -0.155 -0.172 -0.516*** 0.229
(0.168) (0.280) (0.201) (0.334)
Investment Fd. 0.230 -0.251 0.658 -0.048
(0.396) (0.501) (0.950) (0.522)
Corruption 0.041 0.472 -0.715 0.709**
(0.307) (0.570) (0.580) (0.345)
Corporate Taxes -0.137 -1.820*** 1.059 0.650
(0.452) (0.662) (0.888) (0.524)
Exchange Rate -0.156 -0.369*** -0.443 0.184
(0.216) (0.317) (0.430) (0.380)
Euro 0.003 0.010 -0.031 0.046*
(0.021) (0.033) (0.048) (0.026)
αs,t yes yes yes yes
δh yes yes yes yes
#obs 25,446 25,446 25,446 25,446
lnL -2,278,025 -721,431 -721,431 -784,646
Notes: The dependent variable is the value of CBAs vsh,t. Estimation of the panel (pseudo)
Poisson regression with fixed effect αs,t is by maximum likelihood. All explanatory variables
have been transformed into deviations from their mean. Hence, the coefficient estimates
represent an elasticity, that is the percentage change of nsh,t when an explanatory variable,
at its average value, changes by one per cent. The 5% cut-off level is used for V to define
FDI strategies. The data cover a common sample of CBAs for the 1995 to 2010 period and
include observations from 31 source and 58 host countries. Furthermore, #cba is the number
of deals, #obs is the number of observations, and lnL the value of the log likelihood function.
Block bootstrapped robust standard errors are reported in parantheses; 100 replications
(blocks defined by αst). * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; ***
Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 17: Robustness Checks X: Negative Binomial Regression
All CBAs Horizontal
CBAs
Vertical CBAs Conglomerate
CBA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP 0.026 0.083*** 0.032 -0.011
(0.015) (0.022) (0.021) (0.017)
SWP 0.436*** 0.113 0.499*** 0.457***
(0.147) (0.208) (0.177) (0.181)
Distance -1.112*** -1.246*** -1.055*** -1.112***
(0.032) (0.038) (0.033) (0.044)
Language 0.098*** 0.109*** 0.090*** 0.099***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
CU 0.046*** 0.016 0.042*** 0.067***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Trade Freedom -0.015 -0.001 -0.013 0.002
(0.027) (0.051) (0.045) (0.039)
Investment Fd. -0.029 -0.080 -0.041 -0.014
(0.067) (0.093) (0.102) (0.086)
Corruption -0.116** -0.107 -0.072 -0.099
(0.051) (0.086) (0.076) (0.069)
Corporate Taxes -0.694*** -0.738** -0.822*** -0.840***
(0.066) (0.111) (0.085) (0.098)
Exchange Rate -0.116*** -0.298*** -0.235*** -0.190**
(0.050) (0.075) (0.068) (0.081)
Euro 0.009** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
αs,t yes yes yes yes
δh yes yes yes yes
#cba 126,481 24,133 36,334 45,251
#obs 25,446 25,446 25,446 25,446
lnL -37,308 -17,729 -20,517 -23,091
Notes: The dependent variable is the number (count) of CBAs nsh,t. Estimation of the
panel Negative Binomial regression with fixed effect αs,t is by maximum likelihood. All
explanatory variables have been transformed into deviations from their mean. Hence, the
coefficient estimates represent an elasticity, that is the percentage change of nsh,t when an
explanatory variable, at its average value, changes by one per cent. The 5% cut-off level is
used for V to define FDI strategies. The data cover a common sample of CBAs for the 1995
to 2010 period and include observations from 31 source and 58 host countries. Furthermore,
#cba is the number of deals, #obs is the number of observations, and lnL the value of the log
likelihood function. Block bootstrapped robust standard errors are reported in parantheses;
100 replications (blocks defined by αst). * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the
5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
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